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Abstract 
Early retirement is often explained as resulting from a voluntary labour supply choice of a utility 
maximizing individual.  Nonetheless, a lot of individuals perceive retirement as a forced instead 
of a voluntary decision.  This paper tries  to accommodate voluntary and involuntary labour 
supply decisions within one model.  On the basis of a large administrative dataset merged with 
Census  data,  we  estimate  a  discrete-time  competing  risk  model  of  transitions  from  Belgian 
private-sector employees into unemployment, early and old-age retirement while accounting for 
forward-looking retirement incentives.  The estimated coefficients are used to simulate a cut in 
early retirement benefits.  Although this could enhance the financial sustainability of the social 
security system for elderly, one might expect that this may force people to retire involuntarily 
through elderly unemployment where they end up with a lower living standard or even in poverty.  
Alternatively, it could stimulate employees to work longer until they qualify for old-age pension 
benefits.  The model predicts a strong increase of the exit rates towards unemployment between 
age 52 and 57 while exit towards the old-age pension system marginally increases until age 63.  
In particular, blue-collars with physically demanding jobs in traditional industries have a higher 
risk to become unemployed while white-collar workers, members of voluntary saving plans or 
occupational pension schemes and highly educated workers are predicted to move in the old-age 
pension system.   
JEL: J26; C25; H55 
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1  Introduction 
 
In almost every industrialized country, population is ageing rapidly.  These demographic 
trends  have  placed  pressure  on  the  financial  sustainability  of  pay-as-you-go  pension 
systems in these countries, in particular Belgium.  But at the same time that demographic 
ageing  starts  to  treat  the  viability  of  the  Belgian  pension  system,  its  government, 
confronted with reorganisations in the traditional industry, designs several generous early 
retirement  channels  under  the  naïve  assumption  this  would  free  jobs  for  the  young 
unemployed.  What empirical studies show instead is that these early retirement schemes 
did not have any impact on the unemployment rate of the young
1 and also models of 
                                                 
1 See Jousten-Lefebvre-Perelman-Pestieau(2008) and Boldrin et al.(1999) who showed a very weak link, if 
any, between elderly retirement and the activity of the young and prime-age population.   2
labour  market  search  undermine  the  foundations  underlying  this  rhetoric
2.    What 
empirical studies also show is that one of the most important explanations for the decline 
of  the  effective  retirement  age  in  industrialized  countries  is  the  social  security  and 
pension system itself, thereby exacerbating the financial viability problem it faces
3.  It 
has indeed been shown that social security and pension systems contain strong incentives 
to retire early in most OECD countries.   
 
A  frequent  criticism  of  this  explanation  challenges  however  the  key  underlying 
assumption,  that  individuals  choose  their  retirement  age  voluntarily.    According  to  a 
survey by Elchardus-Cohen(2003), more than 40(30)% of Belgian male(female) retired 
involuntarily.  Dorn-Souza(2005) show that involuntary early retirement is particularly 
widespread in Continental Europe and in general in countries facing economic recessions.  
They add that generous early retirement provisions of the social security system do not 
only make voluntary  early retirement more attractive for individuals, but  also induce 
firms to push more employees into early retirement.  In the U.S., nearly one third of the 
retirees  in  the  Health  and  Retirement  Survey  perceive  their  retirement  as  “forced”.
4  
Lindeboom(1998) argues similarly that early retirement schemes in the Netherlands are 
experienced as “ an offer one cannot refuse”.  The fact that a large share of early retirees 
perceives  retirement as “not by  choice” is however difficult to  reconcile with purely 
supply-side explanations.   
 
According to Jousten-Perelman-Desmet(2005), the perception that retirement is a forced 
decision “ does however not mean that this decision is automatically different from the one 
the individual would have freely and rationally made”
5.  A utility maximizing individual 
may rationally decide to quit work but nonetheless may perceive this type of retirement 
as  “not  by  choice”
6.    This  means  that  the  incentive  literature  might  also  provide  an 
explanation for involuntary retirement.   
                                                 
2 Bhattacharya-Mulligan-Reed(2001). 
3 Grüber-Wise (1999-2004).  
4 Szinovacz-Davey (2005). 
5 p.1. 
6 A collectively negotiated agreement between employee organisations and employer organisations may be 
perceived by the individual employee covered by this agreement as “forced”.   3
 
This does not impede that involuntary labour supply decisions may at the same time be 
driven by labour-demand factors.  Unfortunately, due to lack of micro-data at the level of 
the  firm  that  could  be  linked  to  individual  retirement  behaviour,  few  researchers
7 
examined the direct role of labour-demand in explaining early retirement.  For the same 
reason, in this paper, we cannot model the labour demand side either.  Nonetheless we try 
to estimate, as a first aim, a competing risk model that allows for transitions of private-
sector employees to unemployment, old-age and early retirement since such a model may 
account  for  the  fact  that  some  exits  may  be  voluntary  and  others  involuntary.    In 
particular,  we  allow  the  determinants  of  the  transition  from  work  into  retirement 
pathways to be retirement incentives inspired from a labour supply perspective, but the 
importance of these incentives is allowed to be different for each of the various pathways.  
Contrary to most competing risk models in the literature, we account for forward-looking 
measures of retirement incentives. 
 
As a second aim of this paper, the estimated results are used to simulate the impact of a 
cut in early retirement benefits.  To the extent retirement is involuntary one might expect 
that this may force people into unemployment where they end up with a lower living 
standard or even in poverty
8.  We expect that rather blue-collar workers with physically 
demanding jobs have a higher risk to become unemployed.  Alternatively, cutting early 
retirement benefits stimulates employees to work longer until they qualify for old-age 
pension benefits.  We expect that the white-collar and highly educated workers would opt 
to work longer and to move into the old-age pension system.    
 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    The  dataset  that  allows  to  construct  individual 
retirement  incentives  and  relate  it  to  individual  retirement  behaviour  is  presented  in 
section 2.  Section 3 describes the distribution of retirement incentives specific to the 
Belgian  retirement  pathways  (in  particular  old-age  and  early  retirement  and 
unemployment).  After a presentation of the relevant empirical literature in 4.1., 4.2.-4.3. 
                                                 
7 Aubert(2003), Lazear(1986), Crepon-Deniau-Duarte(2003), Paolini(2002). 
8 Several studies on poverty in Belgium (Bonsang-Perelman-Delhausse(2002)) and the EU( Zaidi et 
al.(2006)) find that the unemployed have a high risk of being poor.     4
estimates a discrete-time competing risk model while controlling for these incentives.  
The  estimated  coefficients  are  used  to  simulate  in  4.4.  the  impact  of  a  cut  of  early 
retirement  benefits  on  the  exit  towards  unemployment  and  old-age  retirement  and  to 
analyze who moves where in 4.5.  Appendix I explains how Belgian old-age pension, 
unemployment and early retirement benefits for private-sector employees are calculated.   
 
2  Incentive variables and data construction 
 
Let an individual at age t consider to retire at age R.  The present discounted value of his 
entitlement to future pension benefits was introduced by Feldstein(1974) as: 
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Where 
t s d
-   denotes  the  discount  factor  with  respect  to  time, ) ( t s p the  conditional 
probability to survive until s,  ) (R Ps the pension benefits given retirement at R andt the 
payroll tax rate on wages  s w .  T denotes the expected end of life.  Since an increase of 
SSW can be interpreted as a genuine increase of non-labour income (like an increase of 
initial wealth), SSW is supposed to capture an income effect on the retirement decision.  
If leisure is a normal good, an increase of SSW leads therefore to early retirement.  Two 
other incentive measures can be derived from SSW: the one-year wealth accrual and the 
peak value.  The accrual is the change in SSW due to the postponement of retirement 
with one year: 
) ( ) 1 ( t SSW t SSW AC t t t - + =  
and measures the financial gains or losses associated with an extra year of work.  The 
accrual will be zero if an extra year of work increases future pension benefits such that it 
compensates that by working an extra year the worker loses one year of pension benefits 
and the extra year of payroll taxes that have to be made to the system.  In that case the 
accrual  does  not  distort  the  retirement  decision.    If  however  the  accrual  is  negative, 
leisure becomes  relatively cheaper than consumption such that  there  is a substitution 
effect towards early retirement.  Depending on the particular rules of social security and 
pension provisions, it may happen that SSW attains at a certain age a local maximum that   5
is not a global maximum: it is possible that the gain associated with one extra year of 
work is weak while the gain of working a few years more may be substantial.  To select 
the global maximum, Coile-Gruber(2000) introduced the concept of the peak value: 
[ ] (t) SSW (R) SSW t t - =
³ max
t R
t PV . 
It  is  estimated  by  taking  the  difference  between  SSW  at  the  current  date  and  SSW 
corresponding to the retirement age that maximizes SSW.  The peak value is a forward 
looking measure while the accrual only takes into account differences in SSW between 
two subsequent years.  Beyond the age at which SSW is maximized, the peak value 
collapses to the accrual.   
 
In order to analyse whether these incentives play a role in the retirement decision, micro-
data are required that allow not only the calculation of streams of potential benefits for 
different retirement pathways at the individual level but also the link with the effective 
retirement age of these individuals.  The CREPP of the University of Liège provided us 
with a longitudinal administrative dataset created by the National Institute of Statistics of 
Belgium
9.    This  Institute  selected  29.962  Belgian  fiscal  households  (or  50541 
individuals) with at least one member in the 50-64 age range in 1996.  The was connected 
to the Income Tax Returns(=ITR) for the years 1990
10-1996 and the Individual Pension 
Accounts(1956
11-1996) by means of the national identification number.    
 
The  ITR  contain  all  the  information  necessary  to  calculate  the  income  tax  such  as 
household  composition,  number  and  type  of  dependants  in  the  household,  age,  gross 
labour  and  replacement  incomes  (unemployment,  conventional  early  retirement, 
disability or illness, old-age pension or survivor benefits), housing wealth, occupational 
pension benefits, employee contributions in occupational pension plans, private voluntary 
                                                 
9The original dataset has been set up and used in the context of an international NBER research project.  It 
is also presented in Grüber-Wise(2004). 
10 The tax files were filled in during 1991-1997 but concern income generated in 1990-1996.   
11 This is the year in which the old-age pay-as-you-go pension system for private-sector employees was 
born.   6
savings,…  of  all  household  members
12.      The  ITR  show  in  particular  through  what 
retirement path and at what age individuals retire.   
 
The Individual Pension Accounts contain all the information necessary to calculate gross 
old-age pension rights of private sector employees such as the number of days of work, 
the number of days spent on replacement incomes and the gross wages for every year of 
the career since 1956.  We transformed them, on the basis of the ITR, into individual net 
pension rights and also converted them in real terms.  With this information, one can 
calculate for every private-sector employee in the sample for each possible retirement age 
a stream of net old-age pension benefits and a stream of net unemployment benefits, 
discounted by a real interest rate of 3%
13 and adjusted by his survival probability.  As 
explained above, SSW allows us to derive the accrual and peak value.  This forces us to 
make forward projections of wages: as in Grüber-Wise(2004) and Grüber-Wise(1999), 
we assume real wage increases of 0%. 
 
Interestingly, the ITR and Individual Pension Accounts could be merged with the Census 
of  1
st  of  March  1991
14  that  has  a  response  rate  of  more  than  99%  and  contains 
information on the education level, the professional status of the household head and his 
spouse  (blue  collar  private  sector,  white  collar  private  sector,  civil  servant,  self-
employed,  ...)  and  the  sector  of  activity  they  work  or  worked  in  (chemical  industry, 
banking, insurance, agriculture, socio-cultural services,…).  In particular, the sector of 
activity refers to the NACE code of the corresponding employer up to the class level 
(leading to 999 classes).  This allows us to establish a link with all collective employment 
agreements negotiated at the level of the sector.  On the basis of these agreements and 
information on career and age, one can calculate early retirement rights for all private-
sector employees in the sample for all possible retirement ages.  Finally, on the basis of 
life  expectancy  tables  these  are  converted  into  a  stream  of  early  retirement  rights, 
discounted  by  a  real  interest  rate  of  3%  and  adjusted  by  his  survival  probability.  
                                                 
12 Income data were converted into real data with year 2002 as reference year.  
13 Since the interest rate is not estimated within the model, it has to be fixed a priori.  As usual, we set it at 
3% in order to enhance comparisons across countries.      
14 Every 10 year the Belgian government organizes a Census.  Questionnaires are sent by post to every 
Belgian citizen and they are afterwards personally collected by local civil servants.   7
Measurement  errors  however  arise  since,  because  of  lack  of  information,  we  ignore 
agreements that relax eligibility conditions in case of nightshifts, agreements that are 
concluded at the level of the firm, agreements in the construction sector where disability 
is an eligibility criteria and agreements for firms that are in a restructuring phase what 
could reduce the early retirement age to 52.  The latter means eligibility is only taken into 
account from the age of 55 on, while in our sample 23% of those that retire through early 
retirement schemes do so before 55.  We are thus underestimating early retirement rights 
what may cause measurement errors when estimating the model. 
 
Of the dataset are only selected the individuals who were working in the first year of 
observation as a private sector employee
15.  This leads to a sample of 5831 individuals as 
shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Data construction 
Dataset  Number of individuals 
ITR 1996  50541 
ITR 1995  48752 
ITR 1994  47291 
ITR 1993  47332 
ITR 1992  46907 
ITR 1991  46346 
ITR 1990  46416 
Census of 1
st march 1991  50136
16 (matching with ITR 1996: 99.2%) 
Individual pension accounts 1956-1996  31400
17 (matching with ITR 1996: 62%) 
Private-sector employee in1991  9985
18 (matching with ITR 1996: 20%) 
Private sector employee working in 1991  5831
19 
                                                 
15 First, we do not consider non-statutory employees in the public sector as private-sector employees, since 
they frequently are nominated as civil servant just before retiring and thus end up in a different old-age 
pension system with different retirement incentives what could give rise to measurement errors.  Second, a 
lot of self-employed worked in the beginning of their career as private sector employee but more than 90% 
stopped working as private sector employee at last at age 42.  Although these mixed careers accumulated 
some rights in the old-age pension system of employees besides the self-employed old-age pension system 
that is governed by different rules with different retirement incentives and for which micro-data are scarce, 
we do not consider them as private-sector employee to avoid measurement errors.   
16 Individuals selected from ITR 1996 and in Census of 1991. 
17 Individuals selected from ITR 1996 and for at least one year in individual pension accounts 1956-1996. 
18 Individuals selected from ITR1996 and for at least one year in individual pension accounts 1956-1996 
and declare to be private sector employee in 1991.   8
 
To get an idea about the relative importance of the different pathways into retirement in 
our  sample,  figure  1  shows  on  the  basis  of  the  ITR  of  1996,  the  distribution  of 
employment  status  for  (formerly)  private  sector  employees  by  age  by  distinguishing 
employed, unemployed, disabled, beneficiaries from early retirement schemes and old-
age pensions.  If an individual has labour income, he is defined employed.  If he receives 
unemployment  benefits  (respectively  old-age  benefits;  early  retirement  benefits; 
disability benefits; other replacement income) that are higher than the sum of next year 
other social security benefits
20 and his next year labour income is below the earnings test, 
he  is  defined  unemployed  (respectively  old-age  retired;  early  retired;  disabled; 
beneficiary of other replacement income).  Otherwise, he is defined inactive. 
Figure 1: Distribution of employment status for private-sector employees 
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old-age early retirement unemployment employed other replacement income disabled inactive  
 This reveals in the first place that the percentage of workers decreases steadily with age, 
even before 60.  Secondly, about 40% of the individuals between 58 and 61 years old 
receive  early  retirement  benefits.    Thirdly,  nearly  100%  of  Belgian  private  sector 
employees of 65 are  collecting old-age pension benefits.   Fourthly the percentage of 
individuals younger than 60 that is receiving unemployment benefits turns around 8% 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Individuals selected from ITR 1996 and for at least one year in individual pension accounts 1956-1996 
and declare to be working private sector employee in 1991. 
20 The use of “next year income” avoids measurement errors by which individuals are erroneously qualified 
as non-retired while they effectively retired in a given year.  Suppose f.e. an individual that becomes 58 in 
the end of the year, f.e. in November and thus entitled to early retirement benefits.  His yearly early 
retirement benefits for that year are those from November and December while from January until 
November he receives labour income.  Since his yearly labour income outweighs his yearly early 
retirement income, one could erronously qualify him as employed while he retires at the age of 58.     9
and drops to 2% at 60 to become 0 at 65.   Finally the percentage of disabled is around 
6% and drops to 3% after age 60 to become 0 at 65.   
 
The following figure presents, on the basis of 5831 individuals at risk, the exit rates from 
private-sector employment into unemployment, early and old-age retirement
21.  Since we 
also plot the individuals at risk of exit (that is still employed or right-censored
22), the 
fractions vertically add up to 1.  The exit rates constitute the dependent variables of the 
competing risk model that will be estimated.  It should be noted that the number of 
individuals at risk decreases naturally with age: at age 52 there are 4177 individuals at 
risk while at the age of 66 there are only 18 individuals at risk.  Thus the fact that the exit 
rate into old-age retirement at age 60 is higher than that into early retirement at age 58 
may simply reflect that the former is calculated on a much smaller sample at risk than the 
latter.  
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In order to get an idea what kind of private-sector employees become unemployed, early 
retired or old-age pension beneficiary, table 2 describes the socio-economic profile of the 
                                                 
21 In many countries disability pension is an important opportunity for voluntary labour force withdrawal.  
Parsons(1982) concludes that early retirement in the U.S. can to a large extent be attributed to the 
generosity of the disability program.  In Belgium this is an issue for civil servants who, under weak 
conditions, may retire as “disabled” while receiving old-age benefits up to 3 years before the early 
retirement age in the old-age pension system.  For private-sector employees this is however no issue at all, 
since disability benefits are equal to unemployment benefits.  There is thus no incentive to apply for 
disability subject to rather advanced screening if unemployment benefits are available without screening.  
Moreover, we have no data on the probability distribution of being rejected by the screening.  We thus 
assume that becoming disabled can for a private-sector employee not be imputed to retirement incentives.  
We therefore do not take account of the disability pathway. 
22 Private sector employees still working in the last year of the observation.  We also right-censor private-
sector employees that end up as inactive or with disability benefits or with other replacement income.    10
5831 individuals if they exit to one of these pathways.  Most of these variables will be 
part of the explanatory variables of the competing-risk model that will be estimated.   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dataset (1990-1996) 
  Unemployed  Early retired  Old-age pension 
Number individuals that exit: 2419 
(+3412 right-censored individuals) 
537  1188  694 
Average lifecycle wages(in euro) of the individual
23 
90
th percentile  23.229  25.816  32.309 
75
th percentile  17.873  21.226  26.551 
50
th percentile  13.372  17.053  20.362 
25
th percentile  10.809  14.306  13.679 
Percentage of the career spent on replacement income by the individual
24 
90
th percentile  0.35  0.21  0.19 
50
th percentile  0.16  0.11  0.05 
Distribution of education level of the individual 
Primary  0.30  0.25  0.20 
Secondary inferior professional  0.29  0.32  0.23 
Secondary inferior general  0.145  0.14  0.11 
Secondary superior professional  0.09  0.07  0.16 
Secondary superior technique  0.08  0.10  0.08 
Secondary superior general  0.03  0.034  0.038 
Professional training  0  0.008  0.01 
High school(3 years)  0.04  0.047  0.07 
High school(5years)/university  0.03  0.030  0.10 
Distribution of socio-economic status of the individual  
Blue-collar  0.70  0.66  0.33 
White-collar  0.30  0.34  0.67 
Distribution of marital status of the individual 
Single  0.22  0.15  0.22 
Married  0.78  0.85  0.78 
Distribution of gender of the individual 
Male  0.77  0.89  0.75 
Female  0.23  0.11  0.25 
Distribution of sectoral activity of the individual 
                                                 
23 Calculated on the career from 1956-1996. See 4.1. for the exact definition of this concept. 
24 Calculated on the career from 1956-1996.   11
Agriculture  0.007  0.002  0.01 
Energy, chemical industy  0.09  0.21  0.12 
Metallic, electronic and mechanic industries  0.26  0.37  0.15 
Construction  0.17  0.10  0.04 
Horeca  0.135  0.13  0.16 
Transport and communication  0.08  0.025  0.07 
Banking, insurance  0.05  0.05  0.17 
International institutions, public 
administration 
0.016  0.016  0.02 
R&D, teaching, health  0.014  0.02  0.07 
Socio-cultural  0.04  0.02  0.09 
Other sectors  0.134  0.065  0.10 
individuals with employee contributions in occupational pension plans
25 
  0.13  0.18  0.18 
individuals with contributions for private voluntary savings
26 
  0.26  0.34  0.32 
individuals receiving occupational benefits 
27 
  0.06  0.33  0.56 
Distribution of region in which the individual lives  
Brussels  0.10  0.06  0.15 
Flanders  0.69  0.69  0.55 
Wallonia  0.21  0.25  0.30 
 
This table shows that for all income deciles the average lifecycle wages of elderly that 
retire through unemployment is lower than that of the early retired what is in general 
lower than those who retire through old-age pension except that the 25% income decile of 
the  early  retired  is  higher  than  that  of  the  old-age  beneficiaries.    Concerning  the 
unemployed, one also finds that 50% of them spent 3 times more of their career on 
replacement income than old-age beneficiaries.  Unemployed are less educated than the 
early retired who are less educated than the old-age pension beneficiaries: 17% of the 
old-age beneficiaries did higher studies while this is only 7% for the unemployed.  90% 
of the early retired are men while the decomposition by gender of the unemployed is 
                                                 
25 At least one contribution during the period 1990-1996. 
26 At least one contribution during the period 1990-1996. 
27 In at least one year in the period 1990-1996.   12
similar to that of the old-age beneficiaries.  This is because early retirement schemes are 
predominant  in  traditional  industries  (chemicals,  energy,  metallurgy,..)  that  employ 
relatively more men.  The availability of occupational pension benefits appears to be 
confined to individuals that retire through the old-age pension.  This has among others to 
do with the fiscal treatment of occupational benefits that becomes very generous at the 
age of eligibility for the old-age pension.  Finally, the results that decompose retirement 
pathways by region are illuminating: 69% of the elderly unemployed are Flemish and 
21% of them are Walloon while the weight of the Flemish region in the whole sample is 
only 62% and that of the Walloon region 28%.  This result is confirmed by statistics of 
the Federal Office of Employment
28.  These show that in 2002, 55% of the unemployed 
below age 50 are Walloon and 30% are Flemish while the weight of the Flemish region is 
58.5%  and  of  the  Walloon  region  32.1%.    However,  if  one  looks  at  the  elderly 
unemployed the picture is reversed: in 2002, 57% of all elderly unemployed are Flemish 
and  33%  are  Walloon  while  the  weight  of  the  Flemish  region  is  56.9%  and  of  the 
Walloon region 32.1%   If in addition one looks at the early retired, who also receive 
generous unemployment benefits, one observes that in the national statistics of 2002, 
67% of the early retired are Flemish and 30% are Walloon.        
 
3  Description of financial incentives to retire in Belgium 
 
The dataset presented in the previous section allows to calculate and to describe in more 
detail the retirement incentives (as measured by SSW, accrual, peak value) implicit in the 
Belgian early retirement, elderly unemployment and old-age pension system for private-
sector employees.  As will be shown, the several ceilings, floors and eligibility criteria in 
the systems generate complex incentive patterns.   
 
Calculations are done on the 5831 individuals working as private-sector employees in 
1991 before they have been matched with the ITR 1990-1996.  The idea is to describe 
how  incentives  will  evolve  if  one  would  continue  to  work  until  70  and  to  avoid 
                                                 
28 ONEM-RVA(2002).   13
differential selection into the sample at each age.  Figure 3 shows for the 3 retirement 
pathways, mean SSW
29 as a function of possible retirement age.   
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old-age early unemployment  
First note that in the old-age pension system one could in principle stop working before 
60 and claim benefits from age 60 on
30 while in the early retirement and unemployment 
system one cannot separate the claiming of benefits from effective retirement.  In order to 
enjoy early retirement or unemployment benefits, one should effectively be laid off by 
the employer: retiring and claiming benefits occur at the same time.  This is the reason 
that before the main age of eligibility for early retirement, that is 58, the SSW of the old-
age pension is higher than the one of the early retirement pathway.  Unemployment is 
supposed to be available at 52. 
 
Before the age of 55, unemployment wealth dominates early retirement wealth.  This is 
first because due to lack of data on restructuring firms we put early retirement benefit 
rights  equal  to  zero  before  age  55
31  and  secondly  because  of  different  eligibility 
conditions.  Eligibility for unemployment requires only 3 years of work while eligibility 
for early retirement imposes at least 20 years of work.  If one would look at the individual 
level, one would see that if one is eligible, early retirement wealth is for every age higher 
                                                 
29 In estimations SSW is highly correlated with the accrual and this is mainly due to the fact that the 
variation in SSW is driven by the variation in payroll taxes that are a percentage of wages.  Therefore we 
do not deduct payroll taxes when calculating SSW.  As most reduced-form studies, payroll taxes are in 
addition not deducted since one considers that the retirement decision is not taken at the beginning of the 
lifecycle but rather at an advanced age and by looking ahead.  This view emphasizes SSW as the present 
value of vested pension rights and one considers past contributions as sunk at the moment the retirement 
decision is taken.   
30 Delays in claiming social security benefits have been studied by Coile-Diamond-Grüber-Jousten(2000). 
31 Early retirement wealth is not zero before age 55 because it also contains the expected value of benefits 
to be received after the age 55.   14
than unemployment wealth.  The fact that early retirement wealth increases between 55 
and 58 reflects purely that more and more individuals become eligible. 
 
Since  early  retirement  benefits  correspond  to  60  up  to  85%  of  last  wages  and 
unemployment 55-65% of last wages while the old-age pension benefits between 60 and 
75%  of  average  lifecycle  wages,  it  is  not  surprising  that  both  early  retirement  and 
unemployment wealth dominate old-age pension wealth from the age of eligibility on.   
 
Different factors explain the pattern of SSW.  Firstly, in early retirement (and for low 
wages unemployment) schemes, the “backloading” effect can be quite important in case 
of  strong  wage  increases  at  the  end  of  their  career  since  early  retirement  and 
unemployment benefits are a percentage of last wage, up to a ceiling.   In the old-age 
pension system an additional year of work can also replace a previous low-wages year 
but only for employees with a complete career.  In addition, as long as the career lasts for 
fewer than 40 years for women and 45 for men, benefits are increased by a factor of 1/40 
respectively 1/45
32.  However we found that in our dataset, at the age of 60, 73% of men 
and 76% of women have a career less than 40 years.  73% of the men in the sample 
would thus have to work at least until 65 in order to benefit from backloading.  Secondly, 
an additional year of work after the age of eligibility implies fewer years over which 
benefits can be received.  Mean SSW increases until the age of eligibility to decrease 
thereafter.  Beyond age 65 when means-tested benefits become available for everybody, 
SSW declines even more quickly.  Thirdly, in the unemployment and early retirement 
channel,  the  continuous  decrease  of  wealth  after  the  age  of  eligibility  is  in  addition 
explained by the fact that unemployment and early retirement periods are assimilated to 
worked  periods  in  the  calculation  of  old-age  benefits.  The  reason  why  the  lifecycle 
approach is thus particularly useful is because it captures the effect of the unemployment 
and early retirement benefits now on the amount of old-age benefits to receive several 
years later.  Fourthly, for all retirement channels, a delay in receiving benefits raises the 
probability that the employee might die before being able to collect benefits.   
 
                                                 
32 Some employees started to work at the age of 14 and have a full career before the normal retirement age.   15
The 90
th percentile early retirement wealth peaks at age 55-56.   This corresponds to the 
age of eligibility in particular sectors (construction, glass, textile, mechanics industry) 
after a career of at least 33 years.  On the other hand, the 10
th percentile SSW, that 
contains mainly individuals with incomplete careers, in particular women, shows that, if 
the eligibility conditions are not satisfied some workers better wait until age 60 to retire.  
At age 60, only 20 years of work are required to be eligible for early retirement.  
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Key ages of eligibility for early retirement are reflected in particular by the accrual that 
becomes very high in the year before eligibility and strongly negative thereafter.  Early 
retirement schemes clearly give rise to particularly extreme accruals, compared to the 
unemployment or old-age pension scheme.  The fact that the old-age pension system is 
actuarially  unfair  at  the  margin  is  reflected  in  a  negative  accrual  for  all  possible 
retirement ages.  The accrual is negative before age 60 because the pension rights grow 
by less than the discount rate of 3% while payroll taxes have to be paid.  At age 60, the 
age at which the employee becomes eligible for old-age pension benefits, there is in 
addition a downward jump in the accrual.  From then on, working one more year means 
also  the  loss  of  one  year  of  pension  benefits.    The  unemployment  accrual  reflects   16
seniority increases in benefits at 52, 55 and 58 and signals that for women, who have a 
normal  retirement  age  of  60,  the  transition  from  unemployment  to  old-age  pension 
corresponds to an increase in SSW. 
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The 90th and 10
th percentile accruals of early retirement schemes show even more neatly 
that for some employees it becomes very penalizing, from a financial point of view, to 
retire after age 58 or 60.  The 10
th percentile accrual also shows that for some employees 
(that  do  not  satisfy  eligibility  requirements)  the  switch  from  early  retirement  and 
unemployment to old-age pension at age 65 corresponds to an increase of SSW.   
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Figure 8: 10
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Finally, are also reported the results concerning the peak value.  From the moment that 
the global maximum in SSW is attained, the peak value collapses to the accrual.   
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For the unemployment and old-age channel, the peak value is always negative and thus 
equal to the accruals presented in previous figures.  On the contrary, for early retirement 
wealth the peak value stays strongly positive until the main age of eligibility 58.   
Figure 10: 90











52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
unemployment early old-age  
Figure 11: 10
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To conclude, this section described retirement incentives in the social security provisions 
for Belgian elderly.  It appears that the three pathways under consideration provide strong 
incentives to retire early, although they differ a lot in eligibility criteria.  Up to now, we 
gave only a description of the incentives to retire.  Once that the 5831 private-sector   18
employees  have  been  merged  with  the  ITR(1990-1996),  we  can  relate  individual 
retirement incentives to individual retirement behaviour what will be done next.  
 
4  Modelling different retirement pathways 
 
The  previous  section  showed  that  the  Belgian  social  security  provisions  for  elderly 
provide  strong  incentives  to  retire  early.    This  section  explains  the  discrete-time 
competing  risk  model  (4.2.)  that  will  be  used  to  estimate  exits  from  private-sector 
employment  to  unemployment,  early  and  old-age  retirement,  while  accounting  for 
retirement incentives (4.3.).  The estimated coefficients are then used to simulate a cut of 
early  retirement  benefits  (4.4.)  and  to  analyse  whether  individuals  with  particular 
characteristics, for example blue-collar workers working in specific sectors, have a higher 
likelihood to move towards unemployment than to the old-age pension system (4.5.).  To 
start, we briefly overview in 4.1. how this issue has been modelled in the literature.  
 
4.1   Overview of the literature  
 
Most studies that analyse the relationship between retirement incentives and retirement 
behaviour assume implicitly the responsiveness to incentives is the same whether one 
retires through old-age, disability or unemployment pathways and that these pathways 
can  be  considered  as  substitutes.    For  instance,  Grüber-Wise(2004)  and  Jousten-
Perelman-Desmet(2005) propose a weighted SSW in which the weights of the retirement 
pathway  correspond  to  the  proportion  of  the  population  that  chooses  that  retirement 
pathway.    However  a  competing  risk  or  multinomial  logit  model  may  be  more 
appropriate since it may account for the fact that some exits may be voluntary and other 
channels are involuntary.  Dahl-Nilson-Vaage(2002) use a multinomial logit model to 
account for the fact that “individuals are either pushed into or choose different early 
retirement pathways”.  Also Bloemen(2006) and Bloemen(2008) models a multinomial 
logit of transitions to early/old-age retirement and to unemployment/disability.  He finds 
that in the Netherlands: “the latter is governed by demand side factors, health risks and 
eligibility conditions while the former is more likely to be taken by choice”.     19
 
Some of these models are silent about the impact of financial retirement incentives and 
only account for observed individual characteristics, dummies for eligibility for benefits 
or  current  wages  in  the  explanatory  variables
33.    Mitchell-Philips(1999)  estimate  a 
multinomial  logit  that accounts  for  the  impact  of  SSW  on  the  transitions  from  work 
towards disability, early retirement and old-age retirement in the US.  They estimate the 
probability that an individual i retires through pathway j=1,…,J at time t=1,…,T as  
 
) ( ) ( b a itj it it RI L F j y P + = =  
 
 where  F  is  the  distribution  of  error  terms,  j RI a  measure  of  retirement  incentives 
corresponding to pathway j and  it L  the expected length of the retirement period as a 
proxy for leisure.  Although they allow for different pathways, they impose the same 
coefficient  b   across  all  pathways.    More  flexible  models  allow  for  a 
different j a and j b according to the pathway chosen and allow for complex patterns of 
substitution between alternatives: 
 
) ( ) ( j itj j it it RI x F j y P b a + = =  
 
where  it x denotes  a  vector  of  individual  characteristics.    For  example,  Dahl-Nilsen-
Vaage(2002)  estimate  a  multinomial  logit  that  allows  for  transitions  from  work  to 
unemployment, disability and inactivity.  Examining substitute effects across exit routes, 
they find that a higher potential income of the exit route increases retirement through that 
route while it decreases exit towards other routes
34.  Another example is Wahlberg(2001) 
who models transitions from work to early retirement and partial old-age retirement
35. 
 
                                                 
33 Quinn-Burkhauser-Cahill-Weathers(1998) for US;  Miniaci-Stancanelli(1998) for UK; Schils(2006) for 
Netherlands, Tompa(1999) for Canada. 
34 They include as explanatory variable for one exit route the potential incomes of all possible exit routes. 
35 He includes as explanatory variable for one exit route the potential incomes of all possible exit routes.   20
Since retirement can be considered as an irreversible state, some models account for 
duration dependence in the employment spell and use a competing risk model in discrete-
time with a piecewise constant baseline hazard.  Hazard models have the advantage they 
can account for the endogenous selection of those still working at older ages.  Duration of 
the employment spell is proxied by the time period between the age of eligibility and the 
effective retirement age or by age itself.  It is however not always clear how in that case 
duration  of  a  spell  can  be  identified  from  pure  age  effects  and  from  age-specific 
eligibility rules in pension systems.  Lindeboom(1998) estimates a competing-risk model 
that  allows  for  transitions  from  work  towards  unemployment,  early  retirement  and 
disability in the Netherlands.  He allows the potential replacement rate of one route to 
affect  the  transition  to  other  routes
36.    Hakola(2002),  Tompa(1999)  and  Schils(2006)
 
estimate a competing risk model for transitions of work to disability, unemployment and 
old-age retirement, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, that is the variation 
between  individuals  that  is  not  captured  by  the  observed  variables  and  may  lead  to 
misestimation of duration dependence and biased coefficients.  They use current yearly 
wages  and  Hakola(2002)  uses  in  addition  potential  yearly  pension  income  and/or 
replacement rates as incentive variables.  Hakola(2002) analyzes substitutability between 
pathways  into retirement by including eligibility dummies  for  early retirement in the 
unemployment channel with ambiguous results.   
 
However  extremely  few  of  these  competing  risk  models  (Antolin-Scarpetta(1998), 
Schnabel(2003)) consider the labour supply and retirement decision from a life-cycle 
perspective, in the sense that decisions might be influenced by the expected stream of 
pension benefits to receive in the future.  Both the theoretical and empirical literature on 
retirement  however  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  simply  the  size  of  the  annual  pension 
payments but the present value of the pension benefits and how it accrues with continued 
work  that  emerges  as  important.    Antolin-Scarpetta(1998)  model  transitions  towards 
early/old-age  retirement  and  disability  retirement  and  find  that  in  Germany  old-age 
retirement wealth is a more important determinant of old-age than disability retirement 
                                                 
36 He includes as explanatory variable for one exit route the potential replacement rates of all possible exit 
routes.   21
and that a higher option value decreases both disability, early and old-age retirement.  
Schnabel(2003)  estimates  a  multinomial  model  of  transitions  from  work  to 
unemployment  or  old-age  pension  while  including  option  value/accrual  of  old-age 
pension  wealth,  maximum  unemployment  insurance  duration  and  unemployment 
replacement  rates.    He  finds  that  a  higher  option  value/accrual  decrease  old-age 
retirement but are insignificant in the unemployment pathway.  These few competing-risk 
models that allow for a lifecycle-perspective have the common weakness they do not 
allow for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4.2   The model 
 
Since we want to account explicitly for the variety of pathways from employment into 
retirement and since we consider retirement as an irreversible state
37, a competing risk 
model  will  be  used.    Like  Antolin-Scarpetta(1998),  Schnabel(2003),  Mitchell-
Phillips(2000),  our  aim  is  in  addition  to  account  for  forward-looking  retirement 
incentives. 
 
Since the variables in  the dataset are grouped in intervals of one year, we apply, as 
explained in Jenkins(2005) and Schils(2006), the discrete-time competing risk model, 
assuming that if during the interval there is an exit to one retirement pathway, there can 
be no exit to another pathway in the same interval.  It has furthermore been shown by 
Jenkins(2005)  that the procedure  to  estimate  such  a  model is  equivalent  to  that  of a 
multinomial logistic regression.  Then one can estimate the probability that an employee 



























                                                 
37 A single-spell model is used.  We looked for evidence of reentry in the labour market: 0.7% ( 
respectively 9% and 0.3%) of those with old-age retirement (respectively unemployment and early 
retirement) benefits in last year have positive labour income in subsequent year.  For the elderly 
unemployed one would have enough observations to model simultaneously reentry.  On the contrary, for  
exit to old-age and early retirement, reentry is inexistent and modeling reentry would not make any sense.   22
with
j
0 b   a  path-specific  intercept, 
j b a  vector  of  path-specific  coefficients  associated 
with it x  a vector of exogenous and possibly time-varying explanatory variables that will 
be discussed below and 
j
d q is the path-specific baseline hazard that represents dependence 
on  the  duration  d  of  the  career.    The  model  takes  account  of  right-censored
38  spells 
(individuals that are neither unemployed, early retired nor old-age retired in the last year 
of  the  observation)  under  the  assumption  they  are  randomly  censored.    Because  the 



















As  explained  by  Lancaster(1990),  individual-specific  unobserved  effects  like  ability, 
motivation or attitudes, may affect the probability of retirement.  If these increase the 
propensity to retire, the population at risk of retiring may be over time more and more 
composed of individuals that have a low propensity to retire.  In order to correct for the 
selection bias this generates, one should allow for an unobserved effect.  However, in the 
estimation below, it was not possible to make the model converge while allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity across competing risks.   
 
The explanatory variables include in a first place retirement incentives, in particular SSW 
and  accrual.
39    Besides  retirement  incentives,  we  include  individual  observed 
characteristics  such  as  education  level  of  the  employee,  region  where  he  lives  in 
(Brussels, Wallonia or Flanders), socio-economic status, gender and the sector he works 
or worked in.
40  The age difference between the individual and his eventual partner was 
included to account for possible coordination of household members of their retirement 
decision.  As time-varying variables we include age, age squared of the employee, year 
dummies,  housing  wealth, the  number  of  dependent  children  and  disabled.    We  also 
                                                 
38 Each individual contributes to the likelihood function for every year he is in the dataset but depending on 
whether the last interval is censored or not the dependent variable of the last contribution equals 0 or 1.   
39 We experimented also with the peak value but the accrual gave more accurate results.  This is probably 
due to the measurement error in early retirement rights before age 55.   
40 Since these are measured at the start of the observation period (in 1991) they are sequentially exogenous. 
We consider it very improbable they would vary in the sampling period and treat them as exogenous.   23
included membership of a private voluntary savings plan considering that the decision to 
save in a private voluntary savings plan is anterior to the decision to retire and is expected 
to continue to the age of 65, for fiscal reasons, independently of the retirement age.  
According  to  Bloemen(2006),  “the  motives  for  participating  in  individual  pension 
schemes may be quite diverse: we can imagine that poor occupational pension schemes 
may add to the participation in individual pension schemes, but an alternative may come 
from high income people who have more financial means to invest”.  We finally add the 
log of occupational pension benefits that elderly may receive.  This variable might be 
simultaneously determined with retirement itself, especially old-age retirement.  Up to 
now, we did not account for this possible endogeneity problem through the simultaneous 
estimation of a competing-risk retirement model and an occupational wealth equation, 
like  Bloemen(2008).    The  reason  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  find  suitable  exclusion 
restrictions.    As  in  Bloemen(2006),  our  model  therefore  “assumes  that  there  is  no 
correlation in unobservables between wealth and the labour market state next period. Any 
possible correlation between the two runs via the observables that are included in the 
regression.    The  approach  is  therefore  to  include  as  many  as  possible  observable 
characteristics to explain as much as possible of the correlation between occupational 
wealth and job exit.” 
 
Endogeneity may arise due to an omitted variable bias where the omitted variable is 
correlated with an explanatory variable of interest leading to inconsistent estimation of 
the coefficients.  The identification problem of SSW” concerns the possibility that SSW 
is endogenous since it is correlated with unobserved individual tastes for work.  Those 
with a taste for work would have worked hard all their live, have higher wages and hence 
be eligible for larger benefits and thus a higher SSW.  If one is unable to separate 
preferences for work from financial incentives, one could end up with a coefficient on 
SSW suggesting that a higher SSW decreases the probability to retire while the lifecycle 
theory suggests instead a positive income effect.  Neglecting this identification issue, as 
sometimes happens in the literature, may lead to significant bias in the estimated   24
coefficients.  There are at least two possible solutions
41.  A first possible solution is a 
2SLS procedure in which SSW is replaced by an instrumental variable highly correlated 
with SSW but not with “tastes for work”.  If f.e. our dataset would cover a period before 
and after a pension reform, this would create interesting conditions for a natural 
experiment, as used by Krueger-Pischke(1992), Ranzani(2006) and Meghir-
Whitehouse(1997).  They use interactions between birth cohorts and time dummies as 
identifying instruments of SSW.  In that case, the main source of variability of SSW is 
the one induced by policy changes over time that affect benefits.  Since however our data 
fall between two pension reforms, we opt for the second solution that is to control 
directly for a proxy for “tastes for work” in  it x .  A good proxy should be sufficiently 
correlated with tastes for work such that once it is included, SSW is no more correlated 
with the unobserved effect
42.  If one looks at the way how SSW is constructed, the 
obvious input in SSW that might be correlated with unobserved tastes for work is average 
lifetime wages as suggested by Coile-Grüber(2000), Grüber-Wise(2004) and 
Spataro(2002).  They include average lifetime wages directly in the equation in order to 
capture unobserved taste for work and allow average lifetime wages to be time-varying in 
order to allow for upward wage increases.  A little bit different is the notion of 
“permanent income” of Diamond-Hausman(1984) that we used: a time-constant concept 
of average lifetime wages based on effectively worked periods where they “excluded 
from the averaging procedure years when the individual reported himself as retired, out 
of the labor force for much of the year or working only part time”(p.84).     
 
4.3   Estimation results. 
 
The estimated
43 coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis (and marginal effects in 
bold) in parentheses are in table 3. 
                                                 
41 Schils(2006) uses on the basis of survey data a variable “wants a reduction in working hours” as a proxy 
for the impact of individual preferences for working 
42 See Wooldridge(2002) p.63-65. 
43 The model is estimated in SAS 9.2. by the procedure “glimmix” that models unordered dependent 
variables of a multinomial logit model and produces standard errors and test statistics that allow for 
dependence among repeated observations at the level of the individual.   25
Table 3: Discrete time competing risk model 
  Unemployment  Early retirement  Old-age pension 






















































Education level of the individual 
















































Sector of activity of the individual 
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Goodness of fit 
Likelihood ratio: 8802 (p-value < 0.001) 
Score test: 11690 (p-value < 0.001) 
Pseudo R²: 0.480   27
** denotes significance at 1% level, *denotes significance at 5% level; reference person is white collar 
men, in 1990, in the education/health/R&D sector, living in Flanders, with primary education, no member 
of private savings plan, without children, without disabled; number of observations: 23972 
 
It was explained that the level of SSW can be interpreted as an income effect on labour 
supply while the adjustment of pension benefits for every year of delayed retirement can 
be interpreted as a substitution effect.  If the estimated coefficient of SSW is positive, as 
for unemployment and early retirement, this suggests that the income effect is positive.  If 
the  estimated  coefficient  of  accrual  is  negative,  as  for  old-age  retirement  and 
unemployment, this suggests a negative substitution effect.  The incentive measures have 
a significant impact on the probability of retirement for all pathways, except the accrual 
for  unemployment
44.    This  may  signal  that  unemployment  might  be  driven  by  other 
factors than retirement incentives.   
 
The unexpected sign of the accrual in the early retirement path may be the result of 
measurement errors
45 since early retirement pension rights at the firm level could not be 
calculated.  We tested whether the coefficient of accrual in the early retirement path 
would change if one excludes the sectors of activity from the explanatory variables since 
these may absorb some eligibility rules but this had no effect.  In a second place, the 
unexpected  negative  sign  of  SSW  in  old-age  retirement  may  be  due  to  differential 
selection: individuals that like to work remain longer in the sample than individuals that 
do  not  like  to  work.    The  sample  may  be  over  time  more  and  more  composed  of 
individuals that like to work long. We were unable to make the model converge while 
correcting for this sorting effect.  However we controlled for the fact that people with 
greater preferences for work may work harder and had higher levels of SSW by including 
a  proxy  for  work  preferences.    Higher  average  lifecycle  wages  tend  to  decrease  the 
                                                 
44 Schnabel(2003) finds similarly that option value is insignificant in the transition from employment to 
unemployment while is it significant in the transition from employment to old-age retirement.  He did not 
include SSW.   Mitchell-Phillips(2000) and Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) only included SSW that has a positive 
significant effect on all retirement pathways.  In another model, Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) included only 
option value that has a significant negative effect on all retirement pathways. 
45 Euwals-Vuuren-Wolthoff(2006) have the same problem: “Measurement error may occur if the dataset 
does not allow to observe the exact early retirement and pension rights.  In particular for the construction of 
the financial variables we need to make assumptions”(p.23).  Eklof-Hallberg(2006) have a similar problem.  
Also Grüber-Wise(2004) find that the estimated effect of SSW is in several of the 11 OECD countries of 
the wrong sign.     28
probability  of  retirement  in  general.    If  we  control  for  average  lifetime  wages,  the 
estimated coefficient on SSW turns more positive.   
 
In general if one wants to calculate marginal effects in a multinomial logit model, one 
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0 ) exp( 1 q b b . The direction of the effect is not 
determined  entirely  by  the  sign  of
jk b   because  of,  as  Bloemen(2006)  notes,  the 
competing  risk  nature  of  the  model:”  In  the  extreme  case,  the  total  effect  of  an 
explanatory variable may be opposite to the sign of its coefficient.  If the impact of a 
variable  on  the probability  of  job exit  into  retirement,  measured by  its  coefficient  is 
positive, but there is also a very strong impact of this same variable on the probability of 
job exit into unemployment the sign of the eventual effect of the job exit probability may 
even  reverse”
46.    Bloemen(2006)  calculates  the  marginal  effect  at  different  ages  in a 
multinomial logit model and finds that the sign is opposite when it is calculated at the age 
of 52 (what is the mean age in his sample) rather than 60.  This raises questions about the 
usefulness of calculating marginal effects in this kind of models in this way, given that 
the only reason to calculate marginal effects is to ease interpretation.  As confirmed by 
Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006),  “probit  regressions  per  age  allow  for  a  different 
impact of the financial incentives at different ages.  In our hazard model, we restrict the 
impact  of  a  given  financial  incentive  to  be  the  same  over  different  early  retirement 
ages.
47“   In order to avoid a marginal effect of which not only the magnitude but also the 
sign depends on age, we prefer the approach of Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006) who 
calculate  in  a  discrete  time  hazard  model  the  effect  of  a  change  in  the  explanatory 
variable on the expected retirement age.  An increase of SSW with 10.000euro leads to a 
decrease of expected old-age retirement age with 0.07 years.  An increase with accrual 
                                                 
46 P.16. 
47 P.16.   29
with 1000 euro leads to an increase of the expected old-age retirement age of 0.006 years.  
These  are  small  magnitudes  what  may  be  due  to  the  substitutability  of  retirement 
pathways: if all pathways become less attractive or all pathways become more attractive, 
there is not necessary a reason to switch to a different pathway.  Things will be different 
if only the attractiveness of one pathway will be modified, what will be the explicit 
subject  of  4.4.    In  addition,  it  is  not  clear  whether  calculating  marginal  effects  for 
retirement incentives makes sense in this context since it is difficult to assume that the 
ceteris paribus condition when calculating marginal effects is satisfied: by definition, if 
the accrual (respectively SSW) changes, the ceteris paribus condition that everything else 
remains constant cannot be satisfied because SSW (respectively accrual) changes at the 
same time.  To get an idea of total impact of a change in retirement incentives one should 
compare predicted exit rates before and after a reform in incentives, as we do in the next 
section. 
 
The variable age has a strong effect on retirement probability: it suggests a concave 
relationship in the unemployment path and a convex form in the old-age and early 
retirement path.  A legitimate question is whether the impact of SSW and accrual will 
disappear if we allow for a more flexible specification of age and use age dummies 
instead of a linear age trend.  We also estimated the model with age dummies but instead 
of a quadratic age trend.  By comparing the results, one can note the incentive variables 
barely change.  This shows that the results are robust to the specification of the age 
variable.  
 
Being blue-collar strongly increases the probability of leaving the labour market through 
early retirement and unemployment
48  but is not significant for those who retire through 
the old-age pension system.  Working in particular sectors (mechanics, electronics and 
metallurgy) is also very  significant in explaining  early retirement and  unemployment 
(construction, horeca, transport, other sectors) but is far from significant for explaining 
entry in the old-age pension.  This suggests that early retirement and unemployment may 
                                                 
48Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) finds the same result for Germany.  Schnabel(2003) found for Germany that the 
disincentives created by the welfare system led to more unemployment of unskilled older workers.   30
be related to labour market developments at the demand side such as permanent lower 
labour demand for blue collar workers, employed in physically demanding jobs.  We also 
experimented  with  variables  that  cross  sector  dummies  with  year  dummies  to  detect 
possible business cycle effects that could be sector-specific.  In the energy, chemical, 
mechanic and “other” sectors there is a significant upward trend of early retirement and 
unemployment over time.  The fit in terms of log-likelihood and R² was slightly worse 
than the current version and in order to save space (of 56 dummies) we kept the current 
version.  The year dummies, controlling for business cycles, show a significant positive 
trend of retirement.   
 
Women are less likely to retire through unemployment or early retirement schemes and 
are more likely to retire through old-age pension as already suggested by the descriptive 
statistics in table 2.  An explanation may be that the normal retirement age in the old-age 
pension system is 60 for women while 65 for men in the period under study
49.  This 
would also mean that the gender dummy reflects differences in the incentives structure 
for men and women instead of a pure gender effect.  Having dependants reduces the 
probability of unemployment or early retirement, possibly because of the higher income 
needs of such a household that are better met by continuing to work
50. 
 
Higher educated individuals (with a university or high school degree) are significantly 
less likely to exit the labour market through unemployment.  Individuals with high human 
capital  investment  appear  “insured”  against  unemployment
51.    The  withdrawal  of 
occupational pension benefits is clearly associated with the decision to retire in the old-
age  pension  system  while  it  is,  as  expected,  insignificant  for  those  who  become 
unemployed
52.  Similarly, those who participate in a subsidized private saving plan are 
                                                 
49 In the same line, Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) find hat in Germany women then to move more into early 
retirement than men because of “the early retirement arrangements allowed (before the 1992 reform) 
women to go on early retirement before men”p.17) 
50 Schils(2006) finds for the UK and the Netherlands the same results.  Bloemen(2006) finds also for the 
Netherlands that the absence of children advances the retirement decision.  Lindeboom(1998) found 
however no significant effect of the impact of being women and/or having dependants.   
51 Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) and Dahl-Nilson-Vaage(2002) find the same results. 
52 Schnabel(2003) finds similar results for Germany.   31
significantly less probable to leave the labour market through unemployment
53.   This 
suggests that these plans are confined to higher income individuals. 
 
Concerning regional effects, table 2 showed that the proportion of elderly Flemish that 
are early retired and unemployed is higher than the weight of Flanders in the elderly 
population.  Regional effects become however spurious after controlling for incentives 
and  individual  characteristics.    Finally,  the  age  difference  with  the  partner  was  also 
insignificant.   
 
The goodness of fit tests all strongly reject the null hypothesis that all explanatory 
variables are zero.  Another way to test whether the model fits well is to plot the 
predicted and observed exit rates by age.  The fit seems rather good except that the peak 
in early retirement at 58 and old-age retirement at 60 is underestimated. 
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4.4   Simulating responses to a cut in early retirement benefits 
 
To  get  an  idea  how  retirement  patterns  might  change  in  response  to  changes  in  the 
generosity of early retirement schemes, we simulate the effect of a reduction of early 
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53 Bloemen(2006) finds that “participation in individual pension schemes does not seem to affect the job 
exit rate by any route”.   32
   
where the retirement incentives (SSW and accrual) of only the early retirement pathway 
are replaced by those under the reformed system and we use the parameter estimates 
j b ,
j
0 b and 
j
d q saved from the model in 4.3.  Thus only the early retirement wealth and 
accrual change, while the wealth and accrual of unemployment and old-age retirement 
path remain unchanged.  Table 4 shows that the cut of early retirement benefits leads to a 
strong increase of the exit rates into unemployment between 52 and 57 and to a very 
small increase of the exit rates into old-age pension between the ages 57 and 63
54. For the 
ages 58-60 both exit to unemployment and early retirement is lower and old-age exit 
remains almost unchanged what suggests that individuals work longer. 
Table 4: The impact of an early retirement benefit cut on exit rates 









  Before reform  After reform 
52  0.014  0.031  0.056  0.012  0.036  0.083 
53  0.015  0.039  0.043  0.013  0.045  0.067 
54  0.016  0.050  0.037  0.014  0.060  0.059 
55  0.020  0.065  0.034  0.018  0.072  0.050 
56  0.022  0.073  0.030  0.021  0.080  0.042 
57  0.026  0.086  0.029  0.027  0.087  0.037 
58  0.034  0.091  0.037  0.036  0.087  0.0030 
59  0.046  0.077  0.028  0.047  0.075  0.025 
60  0.140  0.110  0.022  0.141  0.107  0.020 
61  0.128  0.069  0.020  0.129  0.068  0.019 
62  0.160  0.048  0.017  0.160  0.048  0.017 
63  0.225  0.037  0.015  0.226  0.037  0.015 
64  0.307  0.024  0.016  0.307  0.024  0.016 
                                                 
54 Mitchell-Phillips(2000) found on the basis of a similar exercise that the elimination of early retirement 
benefits in the U.S.(between age 62-65) would boost the probability of normal retirement (at age 65) by 
twice as much as the probability of disability retirement.  Antolin-Scarpetta(1998) simulated a reform of 
the German early retirement and old-age pension system and predict that making this system actuarially fair 
at the margin( by adjusting benefits with around 6-8% for each age of retirement deviating from the normal 
retirement age of 65) would increase the average age of retirement of men with almost one year.   They use 
however the estimates to old-age pension while keeping constant job exit into alternative exit routes;  
However, in a competing risk model, the total effect on old-age retirement depends also on the probability 
to exit through other pathways.     33
65  0.657  0.018  0.008  0.657  0.018  0.008 
66  0.646  0.007  0.012  0.646  0.007  0.012 
67  0.599  0.002  0.007  0.599  0.002  0.007 
68  0.851  0.000  0.004  0.851  0.000  0.004 
69  0.870  0.000  0.001  0.870  0.000  0.001 
70  0.931  0.000  0.000  0.931  0.000  0.000 
 
The  decrease  in  the  exit  rates  into  early  retirement  with  1%  point  may  seem  small 
compared to the strong increases of the exit rates into unemployment.  This has to do 
with the fact that the total number of individuals that initially choose early retirement is 
much higher than the total number of individuals that initially ended up as unemployed
55.   
 
4.5   Who moves where? 
 
In order to assess what socio-economic characteristics explain that an individual moves 
towards  unemployment  rather  than  the  old-age  pension  system,    the  change  in  the 
predicted probability of unemployment and of old-age retirement before and after the 
reform is regressed on socio-economic characteristics such as education level, sector of 
activity, blue-collar versus white-collar worker, age…. The dependent variable takes the 
following form: 
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Where j=0 denotes old-age retirement and j=2 unemployment.  The results of this simple 
OLS-regression are presented in table 5 with standard errors in parenthesis.   
Table 5: Who moves into unemployment and into old-age pension? 
Explanatory variables  Unemployment  Old-age pension 
Intercept  1.144**  -0.042** 
                                                 
55 Note also that in the age range below 55 exit rates into early retirement increase: this is because we put 
early pension rights equal to zero until age 55 due to lack of data on restructuring firms while 
unemployment rights are positive before age 55.   34
(0.077)  (0.01) 




Sector of activity of the individual 











































56level of the individual 





















































                                                 
56 The nine education levels were grouped into smaller classes to get more significant results.   35





















* denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%; reference individual is a white-collar men, in 
R&D/teaching/health sector, with primary education level, living in Flanders, no member of private savings 
plan, no member of second pillar; Number of observations: 23972. 
 
The most striking result is that blue-collar workers are significantly more likely to move 
to unemployment in response to a cut in early retirement benefits and less likely to work 
longer and to retire through the old-age pension system.  This is in particular true for the 
individuals that were active in traditional industries like energy, chemical, mechanical 
and construction sector.  This is not surprising since these are typically the sectors that 
may be physically demanding.  As expected, individuals with a high education level 
(university or high school) and individuals that are able to participate in a subsidized 
private  savings  plan  and  occupational  pension  scheme  are  significantly  less  likely  to 
move towards the unemployment system. 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
A  discrete-time  competing  risk  model  was  estimated  that  allows  for  transitions  from 
employees towards unemployment, early and old-age retirement while controlling for 
forward-looking retirement incentive measures.  Early retirement and unemployment are 
significantly related to being blue collar and working in specific sectors.  On the other 
hand, the highly educated, white-collar workers with high average lifecycle wages, that 
are saving in an occupational pension or private saving plan are more likely to retire 
through the old-age pension system.   
 
Work disincentives inherent in all retirement pathways under consideration have large 
and significant impacts on retirement behaviour. The significant impact of retirement   36
incentives suggest that reforms of the system can play a role in response to the financial 
crises that the pension system is confronted with.  However, alternative exit routes should 
be  taken  into  account,  since  changes  in  the  regulation  of  one  exit  route  affect  the 
transition  towards  other  exit  routes.    Results  appear  however  to  be  affected  by 
measurement errors in the incentive structure of the early retirement schemes and the 
inability to correct fully for a sorting effect in the exit behaviour.   
 
In particular, the model predicted that a cut of early retirement benefits leads to a strong 
increase of unemployment between the ages 52 and 57 and a very small increase of the 
exit rates to old-age retirement between the ages 57 and 63.  We found that those who 
initially had chosen the early retirement path, in particular the blue-collars, would in 
response to a reduction in the benefits of the early retirement scheme be more likely to 
move towards unemployment.  This is not surprising since these are typically the sectors 
that  may  be  physically  demanding.    As  expected,  white-collar  workers  with  a  high 
education level, able to participate in a private savings plan and occupational pension 
schemes are more likely to work longer and to retire through old-age retirement. 
 
6  Appendix I: Institutional background 
 
This section describes how old-age, unemployment and early retirement benefits are 
calculated.  The Belgian old-age pension system consists of 4 schemes.  Three schemes 
are organised on a contributory base: the private-sector employees, the civil servants and 
the self-employed.  The fourth consists of means-tested benefits targeted at the poor 
elderly independently of whether these paid payroll taxes.  The latter are available from 
the normal retirement age
57.  The old-age pension system of private-sector employees 
that is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis is described in 6.1., as far as it concerns the 
period 1991-1997 covered by our dataset.  Aside from the old-age pension system, the 
Belgian government introduced for private-sector employees early retirement programs 
                                                 
57 That is, until 1
st July 1997, 65 for men and 60 for women.  Since 1
st July 1997, the age of eligibility for 
women gradually increased to 65 in 2009.   37
that either operate under the name of early retirement scheme (6.2.) or as elderly 
unemployment (6.3.)  
 
6.1  Old-age pension system for private sector employees 
 
The private sector employee scheme allows for flexible retirement between the ages 60 
and 65
58 while it does not impose any actuarial adjustment of benefits on the choice of 
the retirement age.  Nonetheless pension benefits increase by 1/45 for men and 1/40
59 for 
women as long as the employee has not reached a full career of 45 respectively 40 years. 
 
The amount of pension benefits depends on the career and the level of wages obtained 
during each year of that career.  The career sums the periods worked as private-sector 
employee  and  spent  on  replacement  income  (unemployment,  illness,  disability,  early 
retirement schemes,…).  Pension benefits are calculated for each year of the career on the 
basis of real wages or, for periods spent on replacement income, fictive wages.  The latter 
is a fixed amount for periods during 1955-1967.  Since 1967 fictive wages are based on 
the real wages in the last year of activity.  
 
Wages above a price-indexed ceiling (44.994euro in 2007) are not taken into account for 
the calculation of pension benefits.  This ceiling corresponds to the 85
th percentile income 
in our pooled dataset.  Wages are for each year of the career price-indexed and since 
1973  to  the  evolution  of  wages  between  the  year  of  the  career  and  the  year  of 
retirement.
60  From the moment the pension has been taken up, benefits are only adjusted 
to price inflation.   
 
                                                 
58 Before 1
st January 1991, the normal retirement age is fixed at 65 for men and 60 for women and 
retirement could be advanced by maximum 5 years at the cost of a reduction of benefits with 5% for each 
year of anticipation before the normal retirement age.  Since 16 July 1986(Royal Decree 415) it was not 
allowed anymore for women to retire in the old-age system before 60.  Since 1
st January 1991, the actuarial 
adjustment of benefits is abolished.  Since 1
st July 1997, flexible retirement before the normal retirement 
age is conditional on a career of 20 years.  The required number of years of the career gradually increased 
to 35 in 2005.  
59Women are since 1
st July 1997 in a transitory regime that increases the full career from 40 tot 45 years 
and the normal retirement age from 60 to 65 by the year 2009. 
60 The adjustment to general wages gradually disappeared for pensions taken up after 1
st July 1997.     38
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Where n denotes a year during the career, Z the number of years of a complete career, N 
the year corresponding to the take up of the pension, C the number of years of the career, 
In the price or revaluation index corresponding to n, 
max
n w  the wage ceiling corresponding 
to n, wn real or fictive wages corresponding to n and k is a replacement rate equal to 75% 
or 60% depending on whether the beneficiary is married or single.  Only married 
individuals of whom the partner does not receive any labour or replacement income are 
entitled to the 75% rate.   The widow(er) obtains a survival benefit equal to 80% of the 
pension benefit of the former husband or spouse, calculated at the 75% rate.  Note that 
while the age of eligibility for old-age benefits is 60 that survivor benefits are available 
from the age of 45 on. 
 
In addition, when the career is complete, the pension benefit cannot be inferior to a price-
indexed minimum amount.  If the career is not complete but at least equal to two third of 
a  complete  career,  the  same  amount  but  proportional  to  the  length  of  the  career  is 
guaranteed.    
 
Old-age pension benefits are subject to a health insurance tax of 3.55% and a solidarity 
tax between 0.5 and 2% depending on income
61 and the income tax.  Old-age pensions 
are also subject to an earnings test.  For earnings above a limit, pension entitlement is 
fully  suspended.    The  earnings  limit  is  higher  after  age  65  and  higher  for  survivor 
beneficiaries.  The effective income tax rate on retired people is generally very low due to 
income splitting, tax allowances in function of household composition and income related 
tax deductions for replacement incomes.     
 
6.2  Early retirement schemes 
 
                                                 
61 Since 1
st January 1995.   39
Conventional
62 early retirement schemes apply to private-sector employees that are laid 
off by their employer, eligible for unemployment benefits and covered by a collective 
agreement at the national, sector or firm level.  The collective agreement at the national 
level allows for early retirement at the age of 60 after a career of 20 years(less a period on 
replacement income of maximum 3 years).  Agreements at the level of the sector allow in 
many cases in addition early retirement at the age of 58 after a career of 25 years(less a 
period on replacement income of maximum 3 years).  Some sectors such as metallurgic, 
glass and textile industry allow for early retirement at the age of 55 after a career of 38 
years(less a period on replacement income of maximum 13 years). The chemical and 
construction sector and sectors with nightshifts allow for early retirement at the age of 56 
after a career of 33 years (less a period on replacement income of maximum 8 years).  
Finally restructuring firms allow early retirement at 52 after a career of 20 years(less a 
period on replacement income of maximum 3 years).   
 
Early retirement benefits are composed of generous unemployment benefits (60% of last 
wages) supplemented by an allocation financed by the employer.  The employer finances 
at least the difference between 50% of reference wages and the unemployment benefit.  
Some  sectors,  such  as  the  insurance,  banking  and  petroleum  industry,  guarantee  the 
employee 85 to 95% of his reference wage.  Reference wages are defined as last gross 
wages up to a price-indexed wage ceiling minus employee payroll taxes.  The ceiling 
(3.325euro per month at 1-1-2008) becomes binding in our pooled dataset from the 75th 
income percentile on.   
 
One particularity is that once male employees enter early retirement they stay in this 
scheme until the normal retirement age 65 at which they switch automatically to the old-
age pension system.  For women, this is at 60.  During the period in which they enjoy 
early retirement benefits, they do not pay payroll taxes anymore (except a tax of 3.5% 
                                                 
62 Aside conventional early retirement schemes another kind of scheme emerged “Canada Dry” pensions 
referring to a drink that looks like beer but is no beer.  We had to neglect Canada Dry arrangements that are 
non-official arrangements and thus absent from the federal office of employment statistics, by which the 
employer lays off the employee in compensation for a lump-sum or annuity payment on behalf of the 
employer.  Officially this payment does not correspond to a pension entitlement (and thus the employer 
escapes payroll taxes due on conventional benefits) although it looks like one.   40
and a tax of 3% for social security) but continue to accumulate pension entitlements in 
the old-age pension system as if they continued working at their last wage.  The early 
retired are exempted from job search. 
 
6.3  Unemployment benefits for elderly 
 
Eligibility for unemployment benefits requires, for individuals older than 50, a working 
career  of  624 days in the  3 years preceding the  claiming of unemployment  benefits.  
Conditional on eligibility, unemployment benefits are calculated as: 
-40% of last wages for married individuals without dependants 
-50% of last wages for singles without dependants 
-60% of last wages for married individuals and for singles with dependants.  
 
Conditional on a career of 20 years, replacement rates are increased respectively to 45% 
for singles and 55% for married without dependants when beneficiaries are 50, to 50% 
and 60% when they are 55 and to 55% and 65% when they are 58.  Unemployed older 
than 58 and unemployed older than 50 with a career of 38 years are exempted from job 
search.   
 
Last  wages  are  taken  into  account  up  to  a  price-indexed  wage  ceiling(1.832euro  per 
month at 1-1-2008) that becomes binding in our pooled dataset from the 35th income 
percentile.   
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